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Abstract:   Banks have been engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) for over 150 years.
In doing so, they have had to deal with the problems of the liability of foreignness, generally
without being able to depend on proprietary administrative or physical technology. Foreign
direct investment in banking therefore provides many experiments in entry and survival in a
comparable industry across countries and institutional environments.
Within banking, the Norwegian case has a number of useful characteristics. First, there
is a clear and recent starting point for the entry of foreign banks. Second, there is an interesting
mix of entrants and abstainers, and entry strategies. Third, enough time has elapsed that one
can start to observe failures and survivors.
In Section 2 I review the history of the Norwegian banking system and especially
policies towards foreign banks. In brief, Norway has a long history of closure to foreign banks.
In Section 3 I examine which foreign banks did or did not enter Norway when the
government liberalized entry. The banks that entered had divergent firm-specific resources
and followed divergent strategies. I pay particular attention to issues of the foreign banks’ prior
experience in Norway itself and the foreign banks’ advantages vis-à-vis domestic banks. 
In Section 4 I investigate the correlates of survival and exit among the foreign bank
entrants. Survival factors include prior experience in Norway, the size of the entrant at start-
up, and the size of the parent. Lastly, Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.2
Entry and Survival: The Case of Foreign Banks in Norway
1.0 Introduction
Banks have been engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) for over 150
years. In doing so, they have had to deal with the problems of the liability of
foreigness, generally without being able to depend on proprietary
administrative or physical technology. Foreign direct investment in banking
therefore provides many experiments in entry and survival in a comparable
industry across countries and institutional environments.
Within banking, the Norwegian case has a number of useful characteristics.
First, there is a clear and recent starting point for the entry of foreign banks.
Second, there is an interesting mix of entrants and abstainers, and entry
strategies. Third, enough time has elapsed that one can start to observe failures
and survivors.
In Section 2 I review the history of the Norwegian banking system and
especially policies towards foreign banks. In brief, Norway has a long history of
closure to foreign banks.
In Section 3 I examine which foreign banks did or did not enter Norway
when the government liberalized entry. The banks that entered had divergent
firm-specific resources and followed divergent strategies. I pay particular
attention to issues of the foreign banks’ prior experience in Norway itself and the
foreign banks’ advantages vis-à-vis domestic banks.3
In Section 4 I investigate the correlates of survival and exit among the
foreign bank entrants. Survival factors include prior experience in Norway, the
size of the entrant at start-up, and the size of the parent. Lastly, Section 6 is a
summary and conclusion.
2.0 The Norwegian banking environment
i
In 1971 and again in 1973 several foreign banks sought the Ministry of
Finance’s permission to enter Norway. In 1973 the Ministry ruled that
representative offices did not come under the banking law and hence foreign
banks did not require permission. In 1974, the Government formally rejected
applications from foreign banks to establish branches or subsidiaries (Flatraaker
1990). The prohibition lasted until 1985.
Reluctant to let its own banks go abroad, Norway did not have to offer
reciprocity. Norway thus stands in some contrast to the situation in Japan and
Korea (Ursacki and Vertinsky 1992). The attractiveness of the Japanese markets
to foreign institutions enabled Japan to use a strict definition of reciprocity;
Japan could both reduce entry from other countries unwilling to ease their
conditions, and perhaps lever open entry into foreign markets for its own
institutions. Korea had less leverage.
                                                       
i This section draws on Jacobsen and Tschoegl (1995).4
Norway was in no hurry to liberalize entry. Norwegian government policy
after WW II had created a situation that enhanced the attractiveness of the
Norwegian market to foreign banks and hence made closure to foreign banks
even more necessary. The Norwegian government targeted unemployment and
interest rates and Norway’s credit market became one of the most regulated in
Europe. The restrictions on interest rates applied only to the banks and insurance
companies, further distorting competition. Mortgage banks, finance companies,
and so forth could charge market rates. Furthermore, law and regulation forced
the banks to keep 25% of borrowed money as liquid reserves and 40% of their
capital in government bonds.
Consequently Norwegian banks found it difficult to compete with foreign
banks. Instead, foreign banks operating from financial centers such as London
became particularly noteworthy suppliers of credit to Norwegian firms both
abroad and in Norway. Most of the major Norwegian companies borrowed
directly from foreign banks. This was especially true for the shipping industry,
which often needed to borrow currencies and amounts beyond the capability of
the Norwegian banks to provide.
The rise in oil prices after 1974 increased the Norwegian oil industry’s need
for loans to fund investments in the North Sea. Moreover, as oil companies
found more and more oil in the North Sea and Norway’s wealth increased,
foreign banks became increasingly aggressive in approaching Norwegian firms.5
The foreign banks sought to serve the firms' domestic business as well as their
foreign business.
Norway was not alone among the Nordic countries in restricting the entry of
foreign banks, nor was the Nordic hostility a recent development. Since at least
1920, Finland, Norway and Sweden had forbidden foreign banks to open
branches (Wallenberg c.1920). Denmark’s prohibition apparently came later. The
hostility to foreign banks in the Nordic countries appears relatively anomalous
among developed, market economies (Tschoegl 1985). Though it persisted for
decades, the policy of closure eventually collapsed.
Accession to the EEC in 1972 forced Denmark to become the first Nordic
country to open to foreign banks; Denmark opened itself to branches of foreign
banks in 1975. In the 1980s, deregulation of banking swept the Nordics and
numerous other countries as well. Finland opened to foreign banks in 1979 and
Norway opened in 1985. (Even though Finland opened in 1979, Citibank and
Banque Indosuez, the first banks to open subsidiaries, did not establish their
subsidiaries until 1982 after further deregulation and relaxation of exchange
controls.) Sweden was the last, opening in 1986. Even so, Finland, Norway and
Sweden all forbade foreign banks to operate as branches of the parent and
instead required the foreign banks to establish locally incorporated subsidiaries.
All three also limited foreign banks to at most small shareholdings in existing
domestic banks (OECD 1984).6
In 1984 the Norwegian government substantially deregulated the domestic
market. Norway finally allowed foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in
Norway and Norwegian banks to establish branches abroad. A period of
competitive turbulence followed.
Several existing domestic banks merged and investors created several new
domestic banks. Seven foreign banks entered as soon as they could do so in 1985;
ultimately the number of foreign banks in Norway peaked at nine (Table 1).
Ongena and Smith (1997a&b) provide some useful information on banks’
relationships with companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) from 1979
to 1994. Their data (1997a) show that the proportion of firms reporting
relationships with only one bank rose from 65% to over 75% in 1985. Foreign
banks were hardest hit. In 1979 foreign banks accounted for 16% of all
relationships with banks; by 1994 their share had dropped to 5%.
Bank deregulation led to a doubling of loans outstanding as banks pursued
market share (Lindblom 1994). This is consistent with Spiller and Favaro’s (1984)
results for deregulation in Uruguay that suggest that deregulation reduced
oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms. For Portugal, Barros (1995)
found that after deregulation incumbents reacted to each other but not to de novo
entry. He also found that entrants grew faster.
By 1987, the banks' loan loss provisions had begun to rise markedly. (An
additional factor beyond increased risk taking was the government’s
introduction of stricter accounting standards.) In the late 1980s, several smaller7
domestic banks did fail or underwent forced mergers. By 1990, the government
agreed to permit foreign banks to acquire domestic banks.
Deregulation of the domestic market may have resulted in some efficiency
gains. When Berg et al., (1992) examined productivity in Norwegian banks over
the period 1980-1989, they found that productivity appeared to regress prior to
deregulation and then grow rapidly after deregulation. The reduction in the
range of productivity after deregulation appeared to have been the result of the
larger banks reducing their deficiency vis-à-vis the smallest banks. Shaffer’s
(1994) cross-country study using data from 1979 to 1991, showed Norway to
have a highly competitive banking system without excess capacity.
Berg et al., (1993) also compared banking efficiency in Finland, Norway and
Sweden in 1990; the average Norwegian bank was more efficient than the
average Finnish bank but less efficient than the average Swedish bank. Earlier,
Rinde (1986) too had found that Norwegian banks were not less efficient than
those in other OECD countries though Swedish banks did seem slightly more
efficient.
The studies by Rinde (1986), Berg et al., (1992), Berg et al., (1993) and Shaffer
(1993) essentially predate the loan losses that devastated the banking systems of
Finland, Norway and Sweden, among others in the early 1990s. By 1990, the
three largest Norwegian banks, Den norske Creditbank (DnC), Bergen Bank and
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK) were close to bankruptcy. DnC and8
Bergen Bank merged under the name Den norske Bank (DnB). Loan losses
continued to mount (Table 2).
By the end of 1991, the government had come to own 100% of both CBK and
Fokus Bank (now the third largest bank in Norway) and a majority share in DnB.
The government liquidated one smaller bank, Norion Bank, arranged some
mergers and demanded wholesale restructuring of the banks it owned.
After the recapitalization, the banks recovered quickly. However, the
Norwegian government still owns majority stakes in CBK, DnB and Fokus. In
April 1994, the government proposed a medium-term goal of retaining a 50%
ownership in DnB and CBK and a long-term goal of retaining a substantial
minority position (20-33.3%). The government does not plan to retain any
position in Fokus Bank. State ownership of commercial banks remains politically
controversial; the banks themselves have argued that state control of the major
banks is unhealthy for the economy.
The banking crisis in Norway was part of a worldwide phenomenon and not
a particularly Norwegian event. A property boom swept across a number of
countries in the late 1980s. Ball (1994) suggests two primary causes. First,
technical change in key service industries led to an upsurge in demand for
buildings from the mid-1970s onward. Second, deregulation increased credit
availability.
Monetary authorities, attempting to rein-in the credit expansion, ended the
boom. Bartholomew (1994) reports that deflation of real estate values hit banking9
systems in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
Ball (1994) adds Australia, the UK and Japan to the list. Reflecting on the
experience of the US and Japan, Kindleberger (1995) has an insightful paper on
the difficulty that asset inflation poses for monetary policy.
In Norway the crisis peaked a year or so before the peak in the other Nordic
countries (Koskenkylä 1994). One possible reason that the crisis started earlier in
Norway was that the fall in oil prices in 1986 hurt the Norwegian economy but
helped most other major economies. Overall, loan losses were more severe in
Norway than in Denmark and Finland but less severe than in Sweden.
In 1993 Norway acceded to the European Economic Area and agreed to
liberalize further its regulations on entry by foreign banks. On 2 May 1994,
Norway issued regulations authorizing foreign banks to establish branches.
(Anticipating accession, Finland had opened entry to branches in 1991.)
Citibank, Chemical Bank and Svenska Handelsbank announced their intention to
convert their subsidiaries to branches. In 1994, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
opened a branch.
3.0 Who did or did not enter
3.1 The era of the representative office (1973-1984)
Prior to 1985, the Norwegian government only permitted foreign banks to
enter via the limited presence of a representative office. A representative office10
cannot take deposits, make loans, or hold other assets. It is strictly a liaison
between the local market and its parent bank.
Table 3 gives the evolution of representative offices before 1985. The
Norwegian Bankers Association provides inconsistent information in different
publications and I was unable to confirm several of these reported entries in
Polk’s. Still clearly foreign banks were present in Norway for a decade or so
before liberalization. A number of foreign banks were also active in lending to
traditional Norwegian industrial sectors, including oil and shipping but
operated from their home offices.
Citibank established a representative office in Norway in 1973 and Citibank
is now the foreign bank with the longest continuous presence in Norway.
Manufacturers Hanover, Bank of Nova Scotia and Banque Nationale de Paris
followed quickly and were still present in 1985.
The reason that information is vague on so many of the early representative
offices is that these representative offices were probably experiments that failed.
Banks established offices to see if the offices could generate business. When the
offices did not, the parents quickly terminated the experiment.
The representative offices established in the early 1980s may have
represented options on future liberalization (Kogut 1983). Banks often establish
representative offices as precursors to deeper entry (Ball & Tschoegl 1982 and
Tschoegl 1982). Choi et al., (1987) estimated that through 1985, over 60% of the
foreign banks that entered the US first established a representative office. The11
Revised National Budget for 1983 that the Government presented to the Storting
(Parliament) in May 1983 included a proposal to allow foreign banks to open
subsidiaries. The proposal followed public debate and the Finnish example and
may have led some foreign banks to acquire the option.
In addition to serving Norway via representative offices, foreign banks lent
to Norwegian companies out of offices in financial centers elsewhere in Europe,
especially London. The major Norwegian shipping and industrial companies
borrowed directly from foreign banks rather than going through their
Norwegian banking partners. The reason was that Norwegian regulations
hampered the Norwegian banks’ ability to compete in foreign currency loans.
The rise in oil prices after 1974 provided a second impetus to foreign solicitation
of business from Norway, especially the financing of the gigantic investments in
the North Sea.
Of the seven foreign banks that Ongena and Smith (1997b) show as having
relationships with OSE-listed companies in 1979 (Table 4a), only Citibank (1
relationship) had a representative office. One could well argue that there was a
negative correlation between having a representative office in Norway in 1979
and having relationships with OSE-listed companies (Table 4b). Banks such as
Chemical Bank (10 relationships in 1979) and Hambros (6 relationships in 1979)
not only did not have a representative office in Oslo, they did not enter in 1985.
Representative offices may have represented an attempt by banks without12
relationships with top companies to establish a presence in the market
nonetheless.
3.2 The first wave of foreign bank entrants (1985)
When the Norwegian government liberalized entry in 1985, seven foreign
banks entered immediately (Table 5). These initial entrants came from the US (3),
France (3) and the UK (1). However, of the world’s largest or nearest banks, no
Japanese, Scandinavian, German, Dutch, or Belgian banks entered. The UK bank
that entered was a merchant bank and not one of the large commercial banks.
In the 11 years that have passed, four of the seven original entrants have left.
Four Swedish banks have entered or are entering and the first and third to enter
have left. In total, between 1985 and 1996, eleven banks entered, of which five
remain in 1996.
Timing and mode of entry show little variation. The alacrity with which the
foreign banks entered suggests that several would have entered earlier, had the
Norwegian government permitted it. The alacrity is also consistent with the
evidence in Biswas et al., (1995). They find that stock markets react favorably
when banks enter markets where entry formerly was restricted, and unfavorably
when the banks enter markets that formerly were open.
As far as mode of entry is concerned, one could expect that several of the
entrants would have preferred to enter via a branch. Heinkel and Levi (1992)
have an article that links the organizational form that foreign banks adopt in13
foreign markets to the product market the foreign banks are entering.
Norwegian government policy preempted any such choice.
Grubel (1977), in his pioneering article on the theory of multinational
banking, distinguished three markets: wholesale, service and retail. Wholesale
international banking involves operating in interbank markets such as foreign
exchange and offshore currency. International service banking involves
primarily services to corporations and other institutions. Key services include
foreign exchange trading, commercial lending, international payments and the
like. International retail banking involves providing deposit, payment and credit
services to individuals residing in a country other than the bank’s home.
The foreign banks that entered Norway aimed at international service
banking. In the case of Norway, the US and French banks probably followed
their home-country energy multinationals. In general, foreign banks follow the
business of home country firms and seek the business of host country firms
(Kindleberger 1983).
Wholesale banking activity was not an option. Oslo was not and is not an
international finance center (Abraham et al. 1994; Scholtens 1992).
Unsurprisingly, the foreign banks do not seem to have made a push into
retail banking. Only Svenska Handelsbanken has a branch network with which
to gather retail deposits though PK-banken’s (later Svenska Nordbanken)
subsidiary in Oslo received permission to open a branch in Bergen.14
Svenska Handelsbanken’s acquisition of Oslo Handelsbanken in 1990
brought with it 10 branches. Since then Handelsbanken has expanded its
operation to 12 branches and some 60,000 customers (Euromoney 1995). Svenska
Handelsbanken is particularly efficient in retail operations at home and has
taken that advantage to Norway. It apparently can run a retail branch with a
third fewer personnel than its competitors. Svenska Handelsbanken also
established a subsidiary in Finland (1990; converted to a branch in 1991) and a
branch in Denmark (1992).
The other foreign banks may have access to some ethnic retail banking
opportunities (either expatriates or Swedes in Norway) but this would be a
minor factor. The government also originally forbade the foreign banks to
acquire local banks. Even so, absent ethnic or colonial ties foreign banks
generally do not enter retail banking (Tschoegl 1987) and so the foreign banks’
neglect of this sector in Norway is not surprising.
Theory suggests that increasing foreign market commitments will be linked
to knowledge development.  Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argue that,
"...additional commitments will be made in small steps unless the
firm has very large resources and/or market conditions are stable and
homogenous, or the firm has much experience from other markets
with similar conditions. If not, market experience will lead to a step-
wise increase in the scale of operations and of the integration with the
market environment ..."
This suggests that the banks with long-established representative offices
would be particularly well-represented among the first entrants. Banks with15
extensive relationships with large Norwegian firms would have the knowledge
to enter but might have less reason to do so. Table 6a suggests that there was
some tendency for banks with relationships with Norwegian companies to
establish subsidiaries, but the tendency was not strong. Table 6b suggests that
there was a stronger tendency for banks with a long physical presence in
Norway to establish subsidiaries. The only bank with a long-established
representative office that did not establish a subsidiary was Bank of Nova Scotia.
Unfortunately, I cannot apply convincing statistical tests to Tables 6a&b. To
perform a test I would first have to estimate the relevant pool of international
banks that did not have relationships (Table 6a) or well-established
representative offices (Table 6b) in Norway. What I did do was to pick an
arbitrary number, 100, for the missing data. If the true number was less than 100,
the log odds would be smaller and the standard error larger, and if larger the
log odds too would be larger and the standard error smaller. I return to this
issue below.
The key questions in FDI in banking center on the issue of why do banks go
abroad and how do they compete when they get there. Aliber (1976) asks why
the production takes place abroad and why is it the foreign banks that provide it.
Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) ask what advantages do foreign firms
possess that enable them to compete against the local firms that do not face the
disadvantage of operating at a distance and in an unfamiliar market.16
To investigate these questions I perform two OLS regressions with a
dichotomous dependent variable. The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if
the bank in question established a subsidiary in Norway in 1985 and 0
otherwise. The OLS regression is equivalent to multivariate discriminant
analysis. For a fuller treatment of dichotomous regressions in a similar context to
the present see Ball and Tschoegl (1982). For a critique of the general approach
see P.N. O’Farrell et al., (1995).
The population for the first regression is the twenty banks that Euromoney
reported were the top foreign exchange (FX) dealers in the world in 1985
(Winder 1985). The population for the second regression is drawn from The
Bankers list of the 50 largest banks in the world in 1985.
The first set of variables in the regressions represent the banks’ firm-specific
advantages. For the Top 20 FX dealers group, the variable is each bank’s market
share. For the Top 50 Banks group, the variables are a dummy variable for
membership in the top 20 FX dealers group, the natural logarithm of each bank’s
size, and a variable that is the interaction of size and being a top 20 FX dealer.
Tschoegl (1983) and Harrington (1992) among others, have found that size is
strongly correlated with expansion abroad. Large banks tend to have domestic
multinational companies as customers and to have enough customers engaged in
foreign trade to justify themselves going abroad.
I also expect entry to be positively associated with Norway’s imports from
each bank’s home country, and negatively with Norway’s exports to the each17
bank’s home country. Goldberg et al., (1989) find that international trade is
intensive in its use of financial services and that financial services tend to be
exported along with goods. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) and Goldberg and
Johnson (1990) report similar findings.
The negative correlation of entry with imports grows represents a
substitution effect. That is, Norway’s exports to the US or France provide a base
for Norwegian banks to go to New York or Paris. In New York or Paris, the
Norwegian banks then can offer their services to US or French firms with trade
with Norway and compete for this business with US or French banks that have
or would otherwise contemplate having offices in Norway.
An additional theme that has emerged in the literature is strategic
interaction between firms as a motive for foreign direct investment. The
argument dates back at least to Knickerbocker (1973) and Graham (1978) and
takes into account the roles of rivalry between and collusion among firms as
factors in the foreign direct investment decision. The theoretical work in this
area uses a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the interaction between firms
as an open-ended, repeated game. Graham (1990) provides a model for an
exchange of threat scenario. Veugelers (1995) offers a model that enables one to
analyze when strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the
effect of location and firm-specific motivations for FDI. Recent empirical work
includes Yu and Ito (1988), Terpstra and Yu (1989), Ito and Rose (1994) and
Hennart and Park (1994). Engwal and Wallenstäl (1988) in one of the only works18
to focus on the issue of rivalrous behavior in banking find evidence for such
behavior among Swedish banks in their international expansion.
To model competitive interaction I include two variables, SAME and SAME
2.
For a given bank, SAME is the number of banks from the bank’s home country
with a subsidiary in Norway, not including the bank itself. I expect a positive
coefficient for SAME and a negative coefficient for SAME
2. These variables are
not very satisfactory; they assume that for any bank the reference set is only
other banks from its own country and all banks from its own country. Also I
assume that each bank correctly anticipated what its compatriots would do
while formulating its own decision.
To capture the role of prior experience in Norway, in both regressions I have
included a dummy variable for each parent bank’s possession (or not) of a well-
established representative office in Norway. The variable takes on a value of 1 if
the parent bank had a representative office in Norway in 1984 that it had
established before 1980, and 0 otherwise. I expected a positive coefficient.
Lastly, I have a dummy variable for Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB)
in the regression for the Top 20 FX Dealers. SEB could not establish a subsidiary
in Norway in 1985 because it was blocked both by issues of reciprocity and by
commitments to Bergen Bank (see below). I include the variable only to see if the
restrictions were binding.
Table 7 presents the results of the OLS regressions. Apparently the size and
FX dealer variables are not very good at capturing bank-specific advantages.19
Given that a bank is one of the top 20 FX dealers in 1985, the actual market share
is unimportant. In the 50 Largest Banks group, neither size per se nor being one
of the Top 20 FX dealers is itself an advantage, but being large and a top dealer
is an advantage.
As I expected, the volume of Norway’s exports correlates negatively with
foreign bank presence in Norway. The volume of imports correlates positively
with foreign bank presence. For the Top 50 Group, the coefficients are also
statistically significant.
The variables for competitive interaction suggest that entry is associated
with an optimal level of competition. No competitors from the home country
and too many competitors are both associated with less entry than situations
where a few banks from a country have decided to enter.
Having a well-established representative office correlates positively and
statistically significantly with the establishment of a subsidiary.
Lastly, the dummy variable for Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken is negative
but not statistically significant. The variable also suggests that the legal and self-
imposed restrictions were not binding. If I subtract the coefficient from the
predicted value of Y for SEB (0.00), the resulting prediction (0.33) is still below
0.5. This suggests that SEB would not have established a subsidiary even it had
been able to do so. In fact, SEB only established a branch in 1994, well after all
constraints on its freedom had disappeared.20
Neither model makes any prediction errors. If I take the predicted value of
the dependent variable (entry as a subsidiary; yes = 1) and a cut-off point of 0.5,
then each model correctly classifies all the banks in its group. Both models
suggest that Barclays Bank of the UK was close to qualifying to establish a
subsidiary, and both models suggest that Banque Paribas was close to not
qualifying.
3.3 The delayed entry of the Swedes
Swedish banks could not enter Norway until liberalization of foreign bank
entry in Sweden led to a reciprocal opening of Norway to Swedish banks in
1986. Wermlandsbanken, Uplandsbanken and Skanska Banken all applied for
permission to open a subsidiary in 1985; the Ministry of Finance invoked
reciprocity and told them to wait until Sweden had opened to Norwegian banks.
Interestingly, in the Swedish case, there was some tendency for the largest
banks to enter after smaller banks had entered. The three Swedish banks that
applied in 1985 were all small banks, or at least not in The Banker’s list of the top
5 Swedish banks. The largest Swedish banks were bound in pan-Nordic alliances
with the largest Norwegian banks and so could not enter until after the alliances
disbanded (Jacobsen and Tschoegl 1997).
The first subsidiary of Swedish parentage entered in 1986. Skanska Banken
and Wermlandsbanken together established the InterNordisk Bank which
survived until 1993. In 1993, Norway’s Gjensidije Insurance Company acquired21
InterNordisk from Gota Bank, which had earlier acquired Wermlandsbanken.
Uplandsbanken did not re-apply.
Svenska Handelsbank, the second largest Swedish bank in 1985, established
a subsidiary in 1988. In 1990, Svenska Handelsbank acquired Oslo
Handelsbanken which was then in trouble. The takeover was the first ever by a
foreign bank. Svenska Handelsbank converted its subsidiary to a branch in 1995.
Svenska Handelsbank had been a partner with DnC in consortium banks in
New York, London and Zurich (Jacobsen and Tschoegl 1997). Between 1983 and
1986, the partners dissolved their partnership with one or the other acquiring
majority control of each consortium. The dissolution of the alliance left DnC free
to establish a subsidiary in Sweden and Svenska Handelsbank free to establish a
subsidiary in Norway.
Svenska Nordbanken entered in 1990. It was not among the five largest
Swedish banks in 1985. Svenska Nordbanken left in 1995.
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), the largest bank in Sweden, opened a
branch in 1994. It had opened a representative office in 1981 and in the mid-
1980s had acquired 15.8% of Nordlandsbanken, a position it has since sold.
Simonsen (1995) reports that the Financial Services Act of 1988 imposed a 10%
limit on ownership of Norwegian financial institutions by non-Norwegian
citizens; this may have played a role in SEB’s withdrawl. SEB’s membership in
Scandinavian Banking Partners from 1984 to 1994 probably also delayed SEB’s
entry into Norway (Jacobsen and Tschoegl 1997). Still, the results from the22
regressions in Table 7 suggest that membership may have been a non-binding
restriction.
4.0 Who did and did not survive
Twelve years after the liberalization of entry, only three of the original seven
entrants still survive. Citibank and Chase Manhattan (Ex-Manufacturers
Hanover and ex-Chemical Bank) and Banque National de Paris still have a
subsidiary or branch in Norway. Chase Manhattan, Banque Paribas, Banque
Indosuez and Midland Montagu (ex-Samuel Montagu) have all closed their
original subsidiaries or sold them to domestic banks. This survival rate (or lack
of it) is similar to the experience in Sweden where five of the initial 12  foreign
banks entrants had left within five years (Engwall 1994).
I follow the practice in the entry literature of equating success with survival.
Foreign direct investment is fundamentally long-term in its nature so one can
generally infer that truncation represents disappointment. Furthermore, entry as
a subsidiary includes sunk start-up costs that are irrecoverable should the parent
close the subsidiary or sell it to a local bank. A subsidiary is a legal person and
establishing a subsidiary requires the filing of incorporation papers and
registration with all the relevant authorities and registries. (By contrast, a
representative office or a branch is an integral part of the parent and so requires
only notification to the Central Bank.)23
Even so, some ambiguity remains. Closure of the entity does not necessarily
mean that the parent abandons all of the business. The foreign parent may
continue to serve some of its clients from an operation in a nearby financial
center such as London. Still, one can point out that withdrawl means the entrant
was unable to develop sufficient business to require a continuing local presence.
As Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) found for their sample of firms,
foreign banks in Norway were subject both to selection and evolutionary
learning. Selection culled almost half the entrants. Among those that have
survived to the present, several have improved their performance relative to
incumbent firms. Those that made the most progress, however, did so by
acquiring local firms rather than by simply growing more rapidly on the basis of
internal factors.
My results are also consistent with some of Geroski’s (1995) stylized facts
and results about entry. For instance:
Stylized fact 4: The survival rate of most entrants is low and even 
successful entrants may take more than a decade to achieve a size 
comparable to the average incumbent.
Stylized result 8: Both firm size and age are correlated with the survival 
and growth of entrants.
4.1 The experience of the joint ventures
The US, UK and one French entrant entered with wholly-owned subsidiaries
but two French banks entered via joint-ventures with local banks. The foreign
parent of each joint venture eventually acquired complete control. The numbers24
are too small to permit us to say that entering as a joint venture increased the
probability of survival.
We do not have the degrees of freedom necessary to take into account firms’
self-selection of their strategies (Shaver 1996). Firms choose their entry mode to
give themselves the best chance of survival, given the firms’ assessment of their
own competitive advantages; if the probability of mistaken assessments and
entry mode are uncorrelated, entry mode and survival should be uncorrelated.
Of the two original joint-ventures, one has survived to the present and one
has not. Of the five wholly-owned subsidiaries, two have survived and three
have not. I cannot reject the hypothesis that both proportions are the same but
my failure to reject owes more to the small numbers than to the theory surviving
a rigorous test.
Interestingly, the first foreign bank to withdraw was Banque Paribas.
Banque Paribas, unlike the other two French banks, had not established a joint
venture. Banque Paribas also had not established a representative office before
establishing its subsidiary and (partially in consequence) the models in Table 7
had classified it as a borderline entrant.
BNP and Indosuez both took on minority local partners at entry. BNP (75%)
joined with Forretningsbanken (25%) and Indosuez (80%) joined with
Rogalandsbanken (20%). In 1985, Forretningsbanken was the fourth largest bank
in Norway and Rogalandsbanken was the ninth largest. Although
Forretningsbanken had some offices abroad, neither Norwegian bank was a25
competitor in France. By contrast, the three largest Norwegian banks had direct
or indirect (via consortia) representation in Paris. Of the two joint ventures in
Norway, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) still maintains a subsidiary in
Norway and Banque Indosuez closed its subsidiary in 1993.
In 1990, BNP acquired Kjøbmandsbanken and merged it into its joint
venture. When BNP acquired Kjøbmandsbanken BNP became only the second
foreign bank to acquire a local bank (see below).
In both joint ventures the French parent bought out the local, minority
partner. In 1988, Rogalandsbanken sold its shares in the joint-venture with
Indosuez. BNP Kjøbmandsbanken disembarrassed itself of its partner, Fokus
Bank, in 1995 after a lawsuit. (In 1986 Buskerudbanken, Bøndernes Bank,
Forretningsbanken and Vestlandsbanken merged to create Fokus Bank. Fokus
Bank retained the ownership of BNP Norsk it had inherited from
Forretningsbanken. Fokus also opened an office in Paris in 1986.)
The experience of Indosuez and BNP is consistent with Kogut’s (1991) view
of joint ventures as options to expand and acquire. Truncation of the joint
venture may not mean failure but rather that one partner no longer needs the
other’s contribution.
In 1989, after having bought out its partner, Indosuez jumped in rank among
commercial banks in Norway from 25th to 19th place, leapfrogging BNP among
others; in the same year Indosuez’s close competitor, Banque Paribas, withdrew
by selling its subsidiary to Oslobanken. BNP tried to consolidate its control over26
its joint-venture after acquiring Kjøbmandsbanken and over the opposition of its
partner.
4.2 Experience and subsidiary or parent size matter
Three factors show some correlation with survival: prior experience as a
representative office, size of the subsidiary at start-up and size of the parent. The
most powerful explanatory factor is the prior experience. All three survivors had
established representative offices in the 1970s and maintained them until
Norway liberalized entry; none of the banks that withdrew had established a
representative office before entry. These results are consistent with those of
Barkema et al., (1996)
If we look at relationships per se, Ongena and Smith’s (1997b) data shows
that two of the survivors, Citibank and Manufacturers Hanover had
relationships; none of the others had any. BNP, also a survivors, did not have
any relationships in 1985 but acquired local knowledge and experience through
other routes. BNP’s subsidiary was a joint-venture.
The foreign subsidiaries that survived also tended to be larger at start-up
than the failures and to have larger parents. Table 8a gives assets in Norwegian
Krone millions in 1985 for all seven subsidiaries and in US$ billions for the
parents. Table 8b presents results for OLS regressions of a dichotomous
dependent variable (survival: yes = 1 or no = 0) on the logarithm of the asset
measures. None of the results are statistically significant at conventional levels.
However the coefficients have the sign one would expect.27
It is not surprising that the size of the subsidiary should be a slightly
stronger explanatory variable than the size of the parent bank. Both represent the
resources that the venture can muster at start-up. Equivalently, size at start-up is
indicative of customer relationships and relationships correlate positively with
survival (Bergström et al. 1994). However, the size of the subsidiary at start-up is
a more concrete realization of those resources in the Norwegian context than is
the size of the parent.
As I discussed earlier, of the three subsidiaries that Swedish banks
established between 1986 and 1990, the first and third have closed. In terms of
survival factors and the results above, the prognosis would have been mixed but
positive. InterNordisk had fewer assets than all of the other foreign banks but
Samuel Montagu had had at their start-up. Still, Wermlandsbanken, one of the
two original parents, had had a representative office in Oslo since 1981 and
Skanska Banken, the other parent, had had a representative office in Oslo since
1984 under its Swedish name: Sparbankernas Bank.
When Svenska Nordbanken entered it was almost twice as large as Chase
Manhattan’s subsidiary and almost as large as Citibank’s. Svenska Nordbanken
initially grew rapidly. Even so, the subsidiary closed.
5.0 Conclusion
Table 9 gives the names, total assets, employees and branches for all 20
Norwegian commercial banks in 1994. Ten years after entry was liberalized,28
some foreign banks are prominent but owe this prominence to acquisition of
domestic banks not to organic growth. Five of the eleven foreign banks that
established subsidiaries withdrew. Even though foreign banks represent six out
of the 20 commercial banks in Norway, the foreign banks’ market share remains
small.
Experience in Norway appears to matter, both to entry and to survival. That
is, foreign banks with well-established representative offices in Norway were
more likely than banks without such experience to establish subsidiaries when
permitted to do so, and their subsidiaries were more likely to survive. Entry was
associated with firm-level advantages, with market potential as measured by
trade data, and with rivalrous behavior.
The number of firms is too small to test whether survival is independent of
entry mode (joint venture vs. wholly-owned subsidiary). Overall, the evidence
on entry and on joint ventures is consistent with Kogut’s (1983) view of FDI as a
sequential process based on the exercise or abandonment of options.
Finally, the foreign banks’ market share is growing but may well be
stabilizing at a low level. The foreign banks essentially provide a fringe service
tied to import trade and related activities.29
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Table 1
The Norwegian banking system saw consolidation prior to deregulation in 1985, followed by the
entry of foreign banks, competitive turbulence and then another period of consolidation
Domestic banks Foreign banks Total
1980 24 0 24
1981 22 0 22
1982 22 0 22
1983 21 0 21
1984 21 0 21
1985 20 7 27
1986 20 8 28
1987 20 8 28
1988 20 9 29
1989 21 8 29
1990 17 9 26
1991 12 9 21
1992 13 8 21
1993 15 5 20
1994 14 6 20
1995 13 5 18
1996 14 5 19
Source: Norwegian Bankers’ Association, Norwegian Commercial Banks, 1980 to 199436
Table 2



















Source: Norwegian Bankers’ Association, Norwegian Commercial Banks, 1980 to 199637
Table 3
Many banks opened (and closed) representative offices before Norway liberalized entry in 1985
Came Parent Origin Left Location Notes
1969 Schiffshypotekebank zu Lübeck AG W.Germ. <1970 Oslo (1 & 3)
1973 Citibank US Oslo (2) Subsidiary in 1985
William & Glynn’s Bank UK <1974 Oslo (2 & 3)
1974 Manufacturers Hanover US Oslo (2) Subsidiary in 1985
The Bank of Nova Scotia Canada Oslo (1)
Lazard Bros. & Co. UK <1975 (2 & 3)
1976 Landesbank Schleswig
Holstein Girozentrale
W.Germ. <1977 Oslo (3)
Banque Nationale de Paris France Oslo (2) Subsidiary in 1985
1978 Norddeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale Hannover
W.Germ. <1979 Oslo (1, 2 & 3)
1979/80 Société Generale France Oslo (1 & 2; 4 says 1983)
1981 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden Oslo (1) Branch in 1994
Wermlandsbanken Sweden (1 & 4) Subsidiary in 1986
Uplandsbanken Sweden Oslo (1 & 3)
1982 Sundsvallsbanken Sweden Trondheim (1 & 4)
1984 Sparbankernas Bank Sweden Oslo (4; 1 says 1982)
Faellesbanken og Skopbanken Finland Oslo (1)
Banque Indosuez France Oslo (4)
1984 Sparekassen Sydjylland Denmark Oslo (1 & 3)
1985 Credit Lyonnais France Oslo (1)
Helsingfors Aktiebank Finland Tromsø (1)
Union Bank of Finland Finland Oslo (1)
Sources: 1) Commercial Banks in Norway 1985; 2) Norwegian Commercial Banks 1980; 3)
Polk’s does not confirm. 4) Polks.38
Table 4a
Many foreign banks with relationships with OSE-listed companies did not have
representative offices in Oslo in 1979 and did not establish subsidiaries in 1985
1979 1985
Relationships Rep. Office Relationships Subsidiary
Manufacturers Hanover 0 1 1 1
Texas Commerce 0 0 1 0
Chemical Bank 10 0 5 0
Chase Manhattan 1 0 0 1
Citibank 1 1 2 1
Hambros Bank 6 0 3 0
Lazard Bros. 3 0 1 0
Manufactures & Traders Trust 2 0 1 0
Royal Bank of Canada 1 0 1 0
Bank of Nova Scotia 0 1 0 0
Banque Nationale de Paris 0 1 0 1
Société Generale 0 1 0 0
Source: Ongena and Smith (1997b)
Table 4b
There is possibly an association between a bank’s having a long established relationship with
one or more firms in Norway and its opening of a subsidiary there in 1985.
Relationships in 1979
0 or 1 More than 1
Rep. Office in 1979? Yes 4 0
No 1 4
Log odds (after adding 0.5 to each cell) = 3.3 with s.e. = 3.239
Table 5
Between 1985 and 1995, eleven foreign banks established subsidiaries or branches; six are left
Est. Parent Closed Notes
1985 Citibank (US) Established representative office in 1973.
Subsidiary converted to branch in 1994.
1985 Manufacturers Hanover (US) Established representative office in 1974.
Changes name to Chemical after 1991 merger
between Chemical Bank and Manufacturers
Hanover. Name changes again to Chase
Manhattan after Chase merges with Chemical
Bank in 1995.
1985 Chase Manhattan (US) 1992
1985 Banque Paribas (Fr.) 1989 Closed out by acquisition by Oslobanken in
1989. Oslobanken was founded in 1984 and
wound-up in 1995.
1985 Banque Nationale de Paris (Fr.) Established representative office in 1976.
Originally 25% Forretningsbanken.
(Forretningsbanken merged into Fokus in 1986.)
Acquired Kjøbmandsbanken in 1990. Bought
out Fokus’ holding in 1995 after lawsuit.
1985 Banque Indosuez (Fr.) 1993 20% Rogalandsbanken until 1988. Winding up
in 1993.
1985 Samuel Montagu (UK) 1993 Name changed to Midland Montagu. Winding
up in 1993
1986 Inter Nordisk Bank (Swed.) 1993 Established by Skanska Banken and
Wermlandsbanken. Eventually owned by Gota
Bank. Wermlandsbanken merged with
Gotabanken and Skaraborgsbanken to form
Gota Bank. Norway’s Gjensidije Insurance
company acquired Inter Nordisk in 1993.
1988 Svenska Handelsbank (Swed.) Acquired Oslo Handelsbanken in 1990. First
takeover by a foreign bank. Converts to branch
in 1995.
1990 Svenska Nordbanken (Swed). 1995 PK-banken A/S. Changes name in 1990. Leaves
in 1995.
1994 Skand. Enskild.Banken (Swed.) Opens branch in 1994. Earlier had owned 15.8%
of Nordlandsbanken.40
Table 6a
There is possibly an association between a bank’s having a long established relationship with
one or more firms in Norway and its opening of a subsidiary there in 1985.
Relationship recorded before 1981 and still in
1984?
Yes No
Subsidiary in 1985? Yes 2 5
No 4 Arguably large
Log odds (for ‘arguably large’ = 100) = 2.3 with s.e. = 1.8
Table 6b
There is an arguable association between a bank’s having a long established representative
office in Norway and its opening of a subsidiary there in 1985.
Representative office before 1980 and still in 1984?
Yes No
Subsidiary in 1985? Yes 3 4
No 1 Arguably large
Log odds (for ‘arguably large’ = 100) = 4.3 with s.e. = 2.241
Table 7
Trade, competitive dynamics, and experience with a representative office are important in
explaining entry
(t statistics in parentheses)
Top 20 FX Dealers 50 Largest Banks
Raw Standardized Raw Standardized
Constant -0.04 1.1
(-0.05) (0.97)
FX Market Share -0.01 -0.04
(-0.30)
Ln (Assets) -0.11 -0.12
(-1.06)
Top 20 FX Dealer -3.8 -5.9
(-1.9)
Ln (Assets) * Top 20 0.34 5.6
(1.9)
Ln (Exports) -0.10 -0.30 -0.18 -0.78
(-1.5) (-3.8)
Ln (Imports) 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.35
(0.65) (2.2)
SAME 1.0 3.3 1.0 3.9
(3.38) (6.1)
SAME
2 -0.32 -3.2 -0.32) -3.5
(-3.4) (-6.1)









Note: boldface indicates significance at the 5% level on a one-tailed test.42
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Citibank Yes Yes 2 649 143
Manufacturers Hannover Yes Yes 1 573 73
Chase Manhattan No No 0 301 82
Banque Nationale de Paris Yes Yes 0 190 99
Banque Paribas No No 0 254 56
Banque Indosuez No No 0 185 26
Samuel Montagu No No 0 67 2
Table 8b
Size may correlate positively with survival
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3
Raw Stand. Raw Stand. Raw Stand.
Constant -1.9 -2.0 -2.1
(-1.4) (-1.3) (-1.2)
ln (Subsidiary assets) 0.42 0.60 0.28 0.40
(1.7) (0.53)
ln (Parent assets) 0.22 0.57 0.09 0.23
(1.6) (0.30)
R
2 0.36 0.33 0.37
SER 0.47 0.48 0.52
F 2.8 2.4 1.2
N 7 7 743
Table 9





1 Den norsk Bank Govt. owned 154,366 5,198 163
2 Kreditkassen (CBK) Govt. owned 114,582 4,024 148
3 Fokus Govt. owned 27,858 1,119 76
4 BN Bank 23,373 100 1
5 Nordlandsbanken 11,289 438 21
6 Landsbanken 8,350 285 14
7 Handelsbanken Frn. branch 7,974 163 (1) n.a.
8 Industri & Skipbanken 5,908 51 1
9 Bergens Skillingsbank 5,586 148 4
10 BNP Kjøbmandsbanken Frn. sub. 3,465 68 0
11 Finansbanken 3,410 36 0
12 Chemical Bank Frn. sub. 2,552 59 0
13 Romsdals Fellesbank 2,563 129 10
14 Gjensidije 1,245 38 0
15 Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken




17 Oslobanken 474 22 0
18 KreditBanken 440 8 0
19 Citibank Frn. branch 407 24 (1) n.a.
20 Svenska Nordbanken Frn. sub. 347 3 0
Note: 1) 1993 figures. The Norwegian Bankers Association does not report figures for
employees or branches at branches of foreign banks in 1994.
Source: Norwegian Bankers’ Association, Norwegian Commercial Banks, 1980 to 1994